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I. DIRECTOR AND OFFICER LIABILITY
During the Survey period, Texas courts issued an array of interesting,
yet significant, opinions for purposes of individual liability. Two of the
discussed opinions, each issued by the Eighth El Paso Court of Appeals,
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address whether the business judgment rule should be classified as an
affirmative defense under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and
whether members of a limited liability company (LLC) may owe intramember fiduciary duties by reason of a pre-existing implied partnership.
Additionally, during the Survey period, the Second Fort Worth Court of
Appeals demonstrated the significance of broadly-drafted corporate advancement provisions and the distinct nature of an entity’s indemnification and advancement obligations.
A. THE EL PASO COURT OF APPEALS REJECTS ARGUMENT THAT
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED AS
AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

THE

Rule 94 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides a non-exhaustive enumerated list of affirmative defenses.1 Therefore, Texas courts are
left with discretion to classify non-enumerated defenses as affirmative defenses under Rule 94. A defense’s classification as an “affirmative defense” is significant in that such classification places “the burden of proof
. . . on the defendant to present sufficient evidence to establish the defense and obtain the requisite jury findings.”2 In In re Estate of Poe,3 the
Eighth El Paso Court of Appeals was tasked with determining, among
other things, whether the corporate business judgment rule should be
classified as an affirmative defense under Rule 94. Answering this question in the negative, the court of appeals found that, when the defendant
properly raises the application of the business judgment rule, the plaintiff
ultimately carries the burden of demonstrating which of the defendant’s
acts fall outside the confines of the rule’s safe harbor.4
Turning to the relevant facts, Richard C. Poe (Dick) operated three
large car dealerships in El Paso, Texas: (1) Dick Poe Toyota; (2) Dick Poe
Chrysler; and (3) Dick Poe Dodge.5 Dick’s three dealerships were held in
three distinct limited partnerships.6 Poe Management, Inc. (PMI) was acting as general partner, and therefore, was the controlling entity of all
three limited partnerships. While Dick maintained 95% ownership of the
Chrysler and Dodge dealerships, PMI was owned entirely by Dick’s son
Richard.7 Nevertheless, pursuant to an arrangement between Dick and
Richard, Dick was appointed by Richard as the President and sole director of PMI. Richard later testified that the intent of this arrangement was
that “Dick would run the ‘family businesses’ so long as he wanted to, and
upon Dick’s death or retirement, control would pass to Richard.”8
1. TEX. R. CIV. P. 94.
2. Zorrilla v. Aypco Constr. II, LLC, 469 S.W.3d 143, 156–57 (Tex. 2015).
3. 591 S.W.3d 607, 640 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.).
4. See id. at 640–41.
5. Id. at 618.
6. Id. Those limited partnerships were (1) Dick Poe Imports, LP (Toyota); (2) Dick
Poe Motors I, LP (Chrysler); and (3) Dick Poe Dodge I, LP (Dodge). Id.
7. Id. at 618–19.
8. Id. at 620.
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Subsequent to the creation of the PMI arrangement between Dick and
Richard, their relationship quickly began to erode. As a consequence,
Dick amended his will to remove Richard as co-trustee and executor of
his estate.9 Following this revision, and the addition of other trustees and
executors, Dick’s comptroller for the three dealerships, Karen Castro,
and his accountant, Anthony Bock, were designated to serve as co-executors of Dick’s estate. In addition, Castro, Bock, and Dick’s attorney, Paul
Sergent, were each designated as co-trustees.10 Further, Dick inquired
with Sergent as to whether there was anything that he could do to regain
control of the three dealer-operating partnerships.11 Sergent informed
Dick that “the quickest and most efficient way was to buy stock in
PMI.”12 Almost a year later,13 Sergent prepared a “unanimous consent of
the board of directors in lieu of a special meeting” whereby Dick purchased 1,100 shares of PMI stock for $3,209,205, based on a book value
calculation performed by Bock.14 Following the stock issuance, Dick
owned 52% of PMI’s voting shares.15 Richard was never informed of the
stock issuance.16
Just fifteen days following the stock issuance, Dick passed away.17
Three days later, Bock and Castro, as the named co-executors, filed an
application to probate Dick’s will.18 Under the will, Castro and Bock, as
co-executors, were provided with the ability to vote for Dick’s stock in
PMI.19 Pursuant to such power, Castro and Bock, acting by written consent, elected Bock as President, Castro as Vice President, and Sergent as
Secretary of PMI.20 Richard was not invited to the meeting and was removed from his position as Vice President.21
While Richard had, on the same day the will was probated, initiated
litigation against Bock and Castro, Richard later amended his petition to
allege, among numerous other claims,22 breach of fiduciary duty against
each of Sergent, Castro, and Bock in their respective capacities as officers
9. Id. at 620–21.
10. Id. at 620.
11. Id. at 620–21.
12. Id. at 621.
13. In the meantime, Dick and Richard engaged in negotiations for Richard’s
purchase from Dick of substantially all of the assets of the partnerships operating the
Dodge and Chrysler dealerships. However, those negotiations were ultimately terminated
by Dick. See id. at 621–22.
14. Id. at 622–23.
15. Id. at 622.
16. Id. at 623.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 625.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 626. In addition, Richard asserted the following claims: (1) “[d]eclaratory
relief to set aside the stock issuance as a self-dealing transaction”; (2) “[t]hat Dick
breached his fiduciary duties to PMI”; (3) “[t]hat Sergent, Bock, and Castro conspired
along with Dick to breach Dick’s fiduciary duties [to] Richard”; and (4) “[d]eclaratory
relief seeking to establish that Dick lacked mental capacity to agree to the share issuance.”
Id.
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of PMI.23 The claim was subsequently tried by jury where, after the close
of Richard’s case, each of Sergent, Castro, and Bock moved for a directed
verdict under the theory that “Richard failed to overcome the business
judgment [rule] for any of the actions they took as officers or directors of
PMI.”24 The probate court granted Sergent, Castro, and Bock’s motion
and discharged the jury.25
Pursuant to Texas case law, corporate officers and directors owe three
separate duties to the corporation: obedience, due care, and loyalty.26 Important in In re Estate of Poe is the duty of due care. Such duty “requires
a director [or officer] to be diligent and prudent in managing the corporation’s affairs.”27 However, the duty of care, and the breach of such duty,
is subject to what has been referred to in this article as the “business
judgment rule.”28 Specifically, as interpreted by the courts of Texas, the
business judgment rule “protects corporate officers and directors . . . from
liability for acts that are within the honest exercise of their business judgment and discretion,”29 regardless of whether such acts were otherwise
“negligent, unwise, inexpedient, or imprudent.”30
On appeal, Richard argued that the business judgment rule is an affirmative defense which should therefore require Sergent, Castro, and
Bock to carry the burden of proving such defense.31 Therefore, Richard’s
interpretation would place the burden squarely on the corporate actor of
proving a corporate act falls within the safe harbor of the business judgment rule.32
At the start of the court’s analysis, it noted that the “business judgment
rule has been referred to as a ‘defense,’ but [it found] no case holding that
it is an ‘affirmative defense’ under [Rule 94].”33 Additionally, surveying
Delaware authority and Texas federal cases, the court noted that such
authority “concluded that overcoming the business judgment rule was an
23. Id.
24. Id. at 639.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856, 868 (Tex. 2014) (citing Gearhart Indus.,
Inc. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 723–24 (5th Cir. 1984) (interpreting Texas law) (noting that a corporate director’s fiduciary duties include duties of obedience, care, and loyalty)); Johnson v. Brewer & Pritchard, P.C., 73 S.W.3d 193, 200 (Tex. 2002) (noting that an
agency relationship is a special relationship imposing a fiduciary duty on the agent to act
solely in the best interest of the principal); Lowry v. Tarbox, 537 S.W.3d 599, 615 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. denied) (“As a fiduciary, a corporate officer owes the corporation a strict duty of good faith and candor, as well as the general duty of full disclosure
respecting matters affecting the principal’s interests.”) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
27. In re Estate of Poe, 591 S.W.3d at 639 (citing Gearhart Indus., Inc., 741 F.2d at
719).
28. Id.
29. Id. (citing Sneed v. Webre, 465 S.W.3d 169, 173 (Tex. 2015)).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 639–40.
32. Id. at 640 (noting the “allocation of that burden is critical to the standard of review
as it dictates whether Richard had to disprove the defense, or the individual defendants
had to prove it as a matter of law”).
33. Id.
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element of the plaintiff’s case.”34 Nevertheless, the court conceded that
neither the Delaware state nor Texas federal authority was controlling.35
Accordingly, the court proceeded to address Richard’s principal
arguments.
In support of his characterization of the business judgment rule, Richard highlighted language contained in the 2015 Texas Supreme Court
case, Sneed v. Webre.36 Specifically, Richard pointed to the supreme
court’s statement that, in the context of close corporations, “the Legislature did not require shareholders of a closely held corporation to establish derivative standing by pleading or proving that the directors failed to
exercise their honest business judgment. . . .”37 However, the court responded that the supreme court in Sneed recognized that the business
judgment rule may arise twice in the context of close corporations, “once
with the corporation’s decision not to pursue a claim in its own name, and
again when the merits of the underlying claim are decided.”38 To this end,
the court posited that Sneed’s holding only “precludes consideration of
the business judgment rule at the first stage.”39 Conversely, at the merits
stage (i.e., second stage), the court cited Sneed as holding the business
judgment rule is “what a shareholder plaintiff must plead and prove to
establish a derivative right to relief. . . .”40 Therefore, the court concluded
that, because the case had reached the merits stage, “Richard carried the
burden of showing the corporate actions of which he complain[ed] were
not protected by the rule.”41
In re Estate of Poe is significant as it rejects the argument that a corporate officer or director carries the ultimate burden of demonstrating that
his or her actions fall within the protections of the business judgment
rule. Instead, and in concurrence with the characterization of the rule
under Delaware case law, Poe places that burden on the plaintiff. As
such, at least one Texas court of appeals has affirmatively rejected the
notion that the rule should be classified as an affirmative defense for purposes of Rule 94.
B. THE FORT WORTH COURT OF APPEALS RECOGNIZES THE
CONSEQUENCES OF BROADLY DRAFTED ADVANCEMENT
PROVISIONS
Provisions governing an entity’s obligation to indemnify and advance
legal expenses to corporate officials are oftentimes housed within the
same section of the entity’s governing documents. However, it is impor34. Id. (first citing Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 706 (Del. 2009); then citing Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Benson, 867 F. Supp. 512 (S.D. Tex. 1994)).
35. Id. at 641 (stating that “[t]hese authorities are persuasive but not controlling.”).
36. 465 S.W.3d 169 (Tex. 2015).
37. In re Estate of Poe, 591 S.W.3d at 641.
38. Id. (citing Sneed, 465 S.W.3d at 178) (emphasis added).
39. Id.
40. Id. (citing Sneed, 465 S.W.3d at 187).
41. Id.
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tant to note that the two obligations are separate and distinct. For example, depending on the language of the governing documents, a corporate
actor’s right to advancement may be entirely independent of the actor’s
ultimate indemnification right. Additionally, because advancement obligations are permissible and not mandatory under the Texas Business Organizations Code (TBOC),42 entities are left with broad discretion to
craft their own advancement provisions. As such, careful consideration
must be made as to the intended scope of such provisions. In L Series,
L.L.C. v. Holt,43 the Second Fort Worth Court of Appeals demonstrated
one such instance where a broadly drafted advancement provision may
fail to satisfy the expectations of the entity’s management.44
The facts of Holt are relatively straightforward. Conrad Holt was a
member of four Texas LLCs (collectively, the Companies).45 Three of
those companies served as the general partner of three Texas limited
partnerships (collectively, the Dealerships) operating various Saturn vehicle dealerships across the Dallas-Fort Worth area.46 In addition to his
role as president of the Companies, Holt served as the general manager
of each dealership.47
In December of 2016, the Companies and Dealerships brought suit
against Holt, alleging that Holt had “engaged in numerous types of fraudulent activity and ‘financial abuse’ toward the Companies and Dealerships . . . .”48 Holt subsequently filed a breach of contract counterclaim
against the Companies and Dealerships under the theory that he was entitled to the advancement of his legal fees and expenses pursuant to the
company agreements of the Companies.49 After moving for summary
judgment on his counterclaim, the trial court granted Holt’s motion and
directed the Companies to pay Holt his then-incurred attorney’s fees and
“‘future reasonable attorney fees and expenses’ on a monthly basis.”50
Thereafter, the Companies sought a writ of mandamus from the appellate
court seeking a directive that the trial court “vacate its advancement
order.”51
42. See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 8.104(a) (“[a]n enterprise may pay or reimburse reasonable expenses incurred by a present governing person or delegate. . . .”) (emphasis added); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.402(a)(1)–(2) (noting that a limited
liability company “may: (1) indemnify a person; [or] (2) pay in advance or reimburse expenses incurred by a person”) (emphasis added).
43. 571 S.W.3d 864 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2019, pet. denied).
44. See id. at 876.
45. Id. at 867.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. The alleged conduct included “fraudulently recording sales to receive bonuses
from car manufacturers, fraudulently booking sales, making unlicensed insurance sales,
and engaging in various kinds of financing fraud.” Id.
49. Id. at 868.
50. Id.
51. Id. In addition, the Companies sought an interlocutory appeal and the court ultimately found it lacked jurisdiction over that interlocutory appeal. Id. at 872 (holding that
no statutory provision “authorizes an interlocutory appeal of an order requiring
advancement.”).
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At the court of appeals, the Companies argued that the trial court had
abused its discretion because “their suit against Holt d[id] not fall within
the scope of the advancement provisions in the Companies’ [company
agreements] because they sued him for ‘his various bad acts’ rather than
his member status.”52 Accordingly, the court was called to analyze the
specific language contained in the advancement provisions.
Turning to the relevant language, the advancement provision contained
in the company agreements provided that:
[t]he right to indemnification . . . shall include the right to be paid or
reimbursed by the Company the reasonable expenses incurred by a
Person of the type entitled to be indemnified under Section 8.01 who
was, is or is threatened to be made a named defendant or respondent
in a Proceeding [1] in advance of the final disposition of the Proceeding and [2] without any determination as to the Person’s ultimate entitlement to indemnification . . . .53
Therefore, the principal inquiry left to the court was to determine
whether Holt was “of the type entitled” to indemnity under Section 8.01
of the company agreements.54 Turning to Section 8.01, that section stated
that:
each Person who was or is made a party [to a] pending or completed
action, suit[,] or proceeding . . . , by reason of the fact he or she . . .
was serving at the request of the Company and an officer, trustee,
employee, agent, or similar functionary of the Company shall be indemnified by the Company to the fullest extent permitted by the Act
and the TBCA.55
Based on the italicized language, the Companies contended that Holt was
not entitled to advancement as the suit was not “by reason of the fact” he
was serving as a functionary of the Companies. Instead, the Companies
contended that their suit against Holt was “solely for ultra vires acts
outside of his capacity as a member . . . .”56
Rejecting the Companies’ argument, the Holt court noted that such argument “would violate [the advancement provision’s] clear directive that
the right to advancement is not dependent on a determination of the right
to indemnity.”57 Therefore, whether Holt was ultimately afforded advancement rights did not teeter on an inquiry of whether his acts were, in
fact, outside of the scope of his authority as a member and manager of the
Companies. Instead, citing Delaware case law, the court determined that
Holt was only required to demonstrate that the suit and corresponding
allegations were “based on—and . . . causally connected to—Holt’s ser52. Id. at 872.
53. Id. at 873.
54. Id. The court noted that the advancement provisions of three of the Companies’
company agreements were identical and that the fourth was substantially similar to the
point of not necessitating an independent analysis of the provision and language. Id.
55. Id. (emphasis added).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 874 (emphasis added).
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vice as a member and a manager.”58 To this end, the court concluded that
it did not amount to an abuse of direction to find that Holt was entitled to
the advancement right as “at least one of the claims against him is dependent on his member and manager status”—that he breached his fiduciary
duties to the Companies “due to his position as an official manager.”59
As demonstrated in the Holt case, where the entity’s governing documents provide that an advancement right is not dependent on an indemnity right, a corporate official’s rights to advancement may exceed such
official’s indemnity rights. In fact, the Holt court quotes Delaware case
law acknowledging “the tsunami of regret that swept over corporate
America regarding mandatory advancement contracts . . . .”60 As the case
seems to always be, hindsight is 20/20. Therefore, in adopting governing
documents, management and/or shareholders must be mindful of the
practical consequences of the adopted language.
To effectively do so, adequate consideration must be given to the duality of competing interests. On one hand, a broad advancement provision
allows a corporate official the resources to defend what may be a baseless
allegation. Conversely, the entity will be required to advance expenses to
a corporate official who the current management and/or shareholders believe engaged in serious conduct that is detrimental to the entity. Therefore, those adopting the governing documents must be mindful of these
competing interests and the specific objectives sought to be obtained by
the advancement provision. For example, if the Companies’ management
had conducted a review with the competing objectives in mind, the advancement provision may have limited advancement to only claims alleged against the corporate official by third parties. Therefore, by
effectively weighing these interests, management may be better equipped
to stomach the consequences of their entity’s advancement obligations.
C. THE EL PASO COURT OF APPEALS FINDS LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANY MEMBER OWED INTRA-MEMBER FIDUCIARY
DUTIES DUE TO PRE-EXISTING IMPLIED
PARTNERSHIP
The TBOC is silent on the issue of whether a member of a Texas LLC
owes fiduciary duties to his, her, or its fellow members.61 Similarly, Texas
courts addressing the issue have been hesitant to find that LLC members
owe each other fiduciary duties as a matter of law.62 Instead, Texas courts
58. Id. at 876 (citing Paolino v. Mace Sec. Int’l, Inc., 985 A.2d 392, 406 (Del. Ch. 2009)
(finding that “if the corporate powers were used or necessary for the commission of the
alleged misconduct” the corporate actor is entitled to advancement)) (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 874.
60. Id. at 875 (quoting Barrett v. Am. Country Holdings, Inc., 951 A.2d 735, 747 (Del.
Ch. 2008)).
61. See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. §§ 101.001–.114.
62. See, e.g., Entm’t Merch. Tech., L.L.C. v. Houchin, 720 F. Supp. 2d 792, 797 (N.D.
Tex. 2010) (“No Texas court has held that fiduciary duties exist between members of a
limited liability company as a matter of law.”) (first citing Gadin v. Societe Captrade, No.
08-CV-3773, 2009 WL 1704049 (S.D. Tex. June 17, 2009); then citing Suntech Processing
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have espoused the view that whether an intra-member fiduciary relationship exists is typically a question of fact.63 However, when faced with this
very factual inquiry, the Eighth El Paso Court of Appeals, in Houle v.
Casillas,64 turned to the tenets of partnership law. Avoiding the requisite
factual analysis under LLC law, the Houle court instead found evidence
of a pre-existing implied partnership between disputing LLC members.65
As such, the Houle court determined that LLC members can owe each
other fiduciary duties as partners in an implied partnership that predates
the formation of the LLC.
Houle’s factual underpinning began with a business plan between Robert Houle and Jose Casillas.66 In the summer of 2009, Houle and Casillas
agreed to acquire, through an LLC, an older residential home that had
been subdivided into apartments (the Property).67 Additionally, the two
men agreed that Casillas would provide the required capital for the acquisition and renovation of the Property while Houle would oversee and
manage the renovations.68 Thereafter, Houle and Casillas formed Pershing 3901 LLC (Pershing), with Houle individually owning his membership interest and Casillas holding his membership interest through Casco
Investments, Inc. (Casco).69 Through Pershing, the two men purchased
the Property using funds from a promissory note made by Casillas to Pershing.70 Importantly, the promissory note was secured by a deed of trust
on the Property.71
Subsequent to Pershing’s acquisition of the Property, renovations began with Houle having complete oversight of the project.72 While Houle
and Casillas contemplated that renovations would last no longer than
three months, the project had still not reached completion after the oneyear mark. Additionally, the cost of the renovations had already totaled
$45,030.25, an amount over Houle and Casillas’s estimation of $40,000.
Consequentially, on July 6, 2010, Casillas “sent a detailed email to Houle
outlining the parties’ original agreement” and identifying the time and
cost overruns.73
Following the July 6 email, Casillas contacted a local law firm in El
Sys., L.L.C. v. Sun Commc’ns, Inc., No. 05-99-00213-CV, 2000 WL 1780236, at *6 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Dec. 5, 2000, pet. denied) (not designated for publication) (noting “[t]here is
no Texas case addressing fiduciary duties between members in a limited liability company”
and holding the TBOC does not “give authority to the trial court to find a fiduciary [relationship] between . . . members as a matter of law”)).
63. Kaspar v. Thorne, 755 S.W.2d 151, 155 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, no writ.).
64. 594 S.W.3d 524 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.).
65. Id. at 551.
66. Id. at 532. Houle and Casillas had known each other for approximately twenty-five
years and Houle was Casillas’s ex-brother-in-law. Id.
67. Id. at 533.
68. Id.
69. Id. The author assumes Casillas, as a resident of Mexico, structured his ownership
to be indirect through Casco partially to avoid being an individual U.S. taxpayer.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 534.
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Paso.74 That firm advised Casillas that the surest way to protect his investment was to “memorialize” the $45,030.25 he contributed to Pershing
for the renovations.75 To do so, the firm prepared a promissory note in
the amount of $45,030.25 and a second deed of trust securing the note
and identifying Casillas as the lender and Pershing as the borrower.76 The
deed of trust was dated November 15, 2010, and the maturity date of the
note was set for the same day—allowing Casillas to foreclose on the deed
of trust at any time.77 Houle contended he had no knowledge of the two
documents.78
Ultimately, in May 2011, Casillas foreclosed on the Property pursuant
to a substitute trustee’s sale.79 At the sale, JLC Ventures, Inc., an entity
owned by Casillas, purchased the Property for $50,000.80 Interestingly,
Casillas, on behalf of Casco, was the first to initiate litigation following
the sale, alleging claims against Houle for breach of fiduciary duties he
owed to Casco and Pershing. In response, Houle filed a general denial
along with, among other things, counter and third-party claims against
Casco and Casillas for breach of fiduciary duty.81 Specifically, Houle alleged that he and Casillas were partners, and Casillas, “both in his individual capacity and as president of Casco—owed him a fiduciary duty and
duty of good faith and fair dealing.”82 On this issue, Casillas filed a partial
motion for summary judgment, arguing that neither Casillas nor Casco
owed “fiduciary duties to Houle as a matter of law.”83 In response, Houle
attached the July 6, 2010 email he received from Casillas asserting that
the email evidenced the creation of a partnership between himself and
Casillas.84 Nevertheless, the trial court granted Casillas’s motion.85
On appeal, the Eighth El Paso Court of Appeals noted that at least one
Texas court of appeals had held that the TBOC “does not itself impose a
fiduciary duty upon members of an LLC.”86 However, the Houle court
further noted that Houle did “not appear to be arguing that Casillas owed
him a duty as a fellow member of [Pershing], [but] instead, appear[ed] to
find the fiduciary relationship in a pre-existing . . . oral and informal partnership.”87 To this extent, Casillas argued such informal partnership was
“formed when he and Casillas entered into their agreement to purchase
and renovate the . . . Property, and that they formed [Pershing] simply as
74. Id. at 535.
75. Id.
76. Id. Casillas executed the deed of trust on behalf of Pershing in his capacity as
President of Casco, its manager. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 536.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 537.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 538.
86. Id. at 546.
87. Id.
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a means of effectuating their pre-existing partnership.”88 Because the
TBOC recognizes intra-partner fiduciary duties,89 Houle’s seemingly
unique argument became paramount to the court’s analysis.
Addressing Houle’s argument, the court first found that the “fact that
the parties agreed to form an LLC to effectuate their agreement does not
preclude the possibility that the parties already had a pre-existing—and
continuing—partnership.”90 Therefore, the court determined that the
next stage of its analysis would be whether the relationship between
Houle and Casillas could be considered a partnership under Texas law.91
To make this inquiry, the Houle court turned to Section 152.052 of the
TBOC which enumerates five factors of analysis for whether an implied
partnership exists:
(1) receipt or right to receive a share of profits of the business; (2)
expression of an intent to be partners in the business; (3) participation or right to participate in control of the business; (4) agreement
to share or sharing: (A) losses of the business; or (B) liability for
claims to third parties against the business; and (5) agreement to
contribute or contributing money or property to the business.92
In making an analysis of the five factors, the court emphasized that the
“party seeking to establish the existence of a partnership is not required
to provide evidence of all five factors.”93Turning to the five factors, the
court first found the profit sharing factor conclusively satisfied.94 Looking
to the July 6, 2010 email, the court opined that the email demonstrated
“the parties had an agreement to share equally in profits after renovations were completed and after Casillas was reimbursed for his investment.”95 Next, looking to the factor of intent, the court noted that an
expression of intent may be found even where there is no direct evidence
of an intent to form a partnership.96 However, in the evidence before it,
the court found that a single instance of Casillas referring to himself as a
88. Id. at 546–47.
89. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.204 (“[a] partner owes to the . . . other partners . . . a (1) duty of loyalty; and (2) a duty of care. . . .”). See Houle, 594 S.W.3d at 546
(quoting Fitz-Gerald v. Hull, 237 S.W.2d 256, 264 (Tex. 1951) (“[t]he relationship between
. . . partners . . . is fiduciary in character, and imposes upon all the participants the obligation of loyalty to the joint concern and of the utmost good faith, fairness, and honesty in
their dealings with each other. . . .”)).
90. Houle, 594 S.W.3d at 547 (emphasis added). Interestingly, on this point, the El
Paso Court of Appeals cited to another of its opinions finding that a prior agreement between two businessmen created a fiduciary relationship, regardless of the subsequent formation of a business entity. See id. (citing Cielo Vista Bank v. McCutcheon, 719 S.W.2d
658, 660–61 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).
91. Id. at 547–48.
92. Id. (quoting TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.052(a)).
93. Id. at 548 (citing TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.052(c)). The Houle court
further explained that “evidence of all five factors establishes a partnership as a matter of
law, and therefore, the five-factor test is considered on a continuum. . . .” Id. (internal
quotations omitted).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. (citing TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.051). The court further noted that
“[e]vidence of expressions of intent could include . . . the parties’ statements that they are
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“Silent Partner” was insufficient to find a “direct expression of . . . intent
to form a partnership.”97
While the court was brief in addressing the first two factors, it conducted a fairly substantial analysis on the issue of whether Houle and
Casillas participated in, or had the right to participate in control of, the
partnership. Importantly, the court highlighted that the control factor “is
one of the most important factors in determining whether a partnership
exists.”98 Here, holding the factor weighed in favor of a partnership finding, the court primarily emphasized that “Houle and Casillas jointly made
the decision to purchase the . . . Property, decided how to finance the
property, and agreed to form an LLC for the purpose of protecting their
personal interests.”99
Turning to the final two factors, the court first found that no evidence
was present in the record “to suggest that [Houle and Casillas] agreed to
share equally in the losses or liabilities of the partnership.”100 Conversely,
the court found that the record contained sufficient evidence to find each
of Casillas and Houle agreed to contribute money and/or property to the
partnership.101 Important to such finding was Houle’s contribution of his
skills and services in overseeing the Property’s renovations,102 and Casillas’s contribution of the capital necessary to acquire and renovate the
Property.103
When balancing the five factors collectively, the court was left with
three of the five weighing in favor of a partnership finding: “(1) an agreement to share profits, (2) control over the enterprise, and (3) a contribution of money and property to the enterprise by both [Houle and
Casillas].”104 Emphasizing that “these [three] factors are . . . the most
dispositive and important factors,” the court concluded “there [was] sufficient evidence to raise a factual question regarding the existence of a
partnership . . . ,” and therefore, the existence of fiduciary duties between
Houle and Casillas.105
The Houle case is interesting and significant for multiple reasons. First,
the court seemingly abandons what would seem to be the primary analysis—the existence of intra-member fiduciary duties in an LLC. As the
court notes, whether LLC members owe each other fiduciary duties likely
partners, one party holding the other party out as a partner on the business’s letterhead or
name plate, or in a signed partnership agreement.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
97. Id. at 549.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 549–50. Also important to the court was evidence of the division of responsibility, namely, “Casillas providing the financing for the project, and Houle providing his
expertise and management skills in overseeing the renovations.” Id.
100. Id. at 550.
101. Id. at 550–51.
102. Id. Here, the court emphasized that “Houle’s agreement to lend his labor and time
to oversee or supervise the renovations of the . . . Property, was the equivalent of contributing money or property to the partnership.” Id.
103. Id. at 551.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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lies in the question of whether the members are in an unequal position of
power.106 However, such analysis was never performed by the Houle
court. While the omission of the LLC analysis may be explained by Houle
alleging breach of fiduciary duty against Casillas rather than Casco
(Houle’s co-member in Pershing), the omission nevertheless demonstrates that claims for breach of fiduciary duty may be maintained under
theories outside traditional LLC law.
Second, the Houle opinion is significant for purposes of individual liability. Often, for personal protection, individuals will form entities to hold
their LLC membership interests. Here, Casillas did just that in his formation of Casco. By accepting Houle’s implied partnership argument, the
Houle court is effectively disregarding that protection—demonstrating
that an LLC member may individually sue the principal of his or her comember entity on the basis of an implied partnership. As parties will
seemingly always negotiate and document their prospective business plan
before the formation of the LLC, it is difficult to envision a circumstance
where the five referenced factors would weigh against an implied partnership finding. As such, the Houle opinion opens the door for expanded
individual fiduciary duties and liability for the principals of entities holding LLC interests.
II. MALPRACTICE LIABILITY
In 2019, rulings out of Texas’s Supreme Court and appellate courts
made it less likely for attorneys to be found liable under traditional conflict-of-interest claims, but more likely to be haled into court long after
having concluded the representation and to have to rebut the live testimony of the judge that presided over the proceeding giving rise to the
malpractice claim.
A. THE SUPREME COURT CLARIFIES AN EXCEPTION
CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST RULE

TO THE

In May 2019, the Texas Supreme Court issued a well-reasoned opinion
denying mandamus relief to an aggrieved party and former client in a
guardianship proceeding who sought to disqualify former counsel for an
alleged violation of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.
In doing so, the supreme court wrestled with simultaneous application of
seemingly unreconcilable rules—1.02, 1.06, and 1.09. In the end, the supreme court, speaking through Chief Justice Hecht, opined that the attorney’s representation of the party applying for temporary guardianship of
a former client was not a conflict of interest and did not require
disqualification.107
In In re Thetford,108 the Appellee, Jamie Rogers, represented by her
106. Id. at 546 (citing Suntech Processing Sys., L.L.C. v. Sun Commc’ns, Inc., No. 05-9900213-CV, 2000 WL 1780236, at *6–7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 5, 2000, pet. denied)).
107. In re Thetford, 574 S.W.3d 362, 374–81 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding).
108. See id.
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attorney, Alfred Allen, filed an application for temporary guardianship of
Rogers’s aunt, Verna Thetford, including guardianship of Thetford’s person and establishment of a management trust for her estate. Thetford
moved to disqualify Allen, arguing to the lower court that Allen had violated fiduciary duties he owed to Thetford as her former attorney. The
trial court denied Thetford’s motion to disqualify and appointed Allen’s
new client, Rogers, as temporary guardian for Thetford.109 Before the
supreme court, Thetford recast her argument, maintaining that the Texas
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct—specifically Rules 1.06(b)
and 1.09(a)(3)—required that Allen be disqualified due to an inherent
and overt conflict of interest. The supreme court held that the Rules permit otherwise conflicting representations in limited circumstances, like
here, where the attorney has demonstrably advanced the interests of his
former client by finding her a guardian.110 The supreme court further
held that Thetford’s argument was not convincing enough to overcome
the deference owed to the trial court’s discretion.111
Three Disciplinary Rules were examined:
A lawyer shall take reasonable action to secure the appointment of a
guardian or other legal representative for, or seek other protective
orders with respect to, a client whenever the lawyer reasonably believes that the client lacks legal competence and that such action
should be taken to protect the client.112
A lawyer shall not represent opposing parties to the same litigation.
[A] lawyer shall not represent a person if the representation of that
person: . . . (1) involves a substantially related matter in which the
person’s interest are materially and directly adverse to the interests
of another client of the lawyer or the lawyer’s firm; or (2) reasonably
appear to be or become adversely limited by the lawyer’s or law
firm’s responsibilities to another client or to a third person or by the
lawyer’s or law firm’s own interests.113
Without prior consent, a lawyer who personally has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in a matter adverse to the former client . . . if it is the same or a
substantially related matter.114
From the outset, the supreme court recognized that “[g]uardianship
proceedings present difficult ethical issues for lawyers.”115 But, despite
such complicated ethical issues, the parties’ arguments were exceedingly
simple. Allen argued that Rule 1.02(g) required him, as Thetford’s law109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 369.
Id. at 365.
Id.
TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.02(g), reprinted in TEX. GOV’T
CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, § 9).
113. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.06(a)–(b).
114. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.09(a)(3).
115. In re Thetford, 574 S.W.3d at 365.
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yer, to institute guardianship proceedings for her by representing Rogers.116 Thetford argued that she was Allen’s client in 2017 when the
guardianship application was filed, and therefore, Allen’s representation
of Rogers was a conflict of interest under Rule 1.09(a)(3).117 In the alternative, Thetford argued that, even if she was Allen’s client in 2017, the
representation violated Rule 1.06(a).118
The supreme court determined that Rule 1.02(g)’s requirement that attorneys take “reasonable action[s]” “expressly allows, but does not also
require, the attorney to institute a guardianship proceeding.”119 And
though “Rule 1.02(g) does not trump the conflict-of-interest rules,” the
supreme court noted the severity of disqualification as a remedy, the requirement that the trial court evaluate disqualification motions by
“strictly adher[ing] to an exacting standard,” and that the supreme court
give deference to the trial court’s decision unless the trial court has acted
“without any reference to guiding rules or principles.”120
Thetford was required to prove that: (1) Allen represented her and
Rogers in “substantially related” matters; and (2) the guardianship proceeding was “adverse” to her interests.121 The supreme court found Thetford could prove neither.122
To prove that the matters were “substantially related,” Thetford was
challenged with showing that the overlapping facts created “a genuine
threat of disclosure.”123 She could not. Thetford argued that confidential
information shared with Allen concerning the disposition of her estate
could be used against her in the guardianship proceeding.124 The supreme
court reasoned that the overlap was only facial—Thetford was unable to
prove how confidences shared during the preparation of her will could be
used against her in the guardianship proceeding, which was purposed to
determine whether Thetford was “incapacitated.”125 Any confidences disclosed to Allen were irrelevant.126
But even if Thetford had been able to prove a substantial relationship
between the two proceedings, the supreme court rejected Thetford’s argument that Allen’s representation of Rogers in the guardianship proceeding was adverse.127 The supreme court’s interpretation of Rule 1.06
and 1.09’s “direct adversity” requirement was informed by the comments
to Rule 1.06(b) which characterize “direct adversity” as existing when
“the lawyer’s independent judgment on behalf of a client or the lawyer’s
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 371.
Id. at 372.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 373–74.
Id. at 374.
Id. at 375, 380.
Id. at 374.
See id. at 375.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 375–80.
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ability or willingness to consider, recommend or carry out a course of
action will be or is reasonably likely to be adversely affected by the lawyer’s representation of, or responsibilities to, the other client.”128 According to the comments, requisite adversity can also be found when the
“lawyer reasonably appears to be called upon to espouse adverse positions in the same matter.”129 As for Rule 1.06(a)’s prohibition against the
representation of “opposing parties to the same litigation,” the comments
state that such “opposition” is established when “a judgment favorable to
one of the parties will directly impact unfavorably upon the other
party.”130
The supreme court reasoned that guardianship proceeding are generally “not adversar[ial] in character” because they are “designed to promote and protect the well-being of the incapacitated person.”131 The
American Bar Association’s (ABA) commentary on Model Rule 1.14(b)
was considered. The ABA’s Commission on Ethics and Professional Responsibility reasoned that filing a petition for guardianship on behalf of
an incapacitated client is a “narrow exception” to the conflict-of-interest
rules, but that dual-representation, such as in the present case, would be
regarded as adverse unless and until the court makes the necessary determination of incompetence.132 The supreme court rejected the ABA’s
analysis, finding that it provided “scant justification for [its] sweeping
declaration” and “prioritizes the conflict-of-interest rules over the lawyer’s judgment about what’s in the best interests of the client.”133
Instead, the supreme court concluded that 1.02(g) and the conflict-ofinterest rules should be read together as provided for in the American
Law Institute’s Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, Section 24A—acknowledging that lawyers are sometimes forced to choose
between “imperfect alternatives.”134 As such, the supreme court held that
in order for a guardianship proceeding to be adverse:
[1] the applicant’s interests must be adverse to the proposed ward’s
. . . as the proposed ward would have defined them when she had
capacity; [and]
[2] [i]n the absence of evidence of how the proposed ward would
have defined her interests, . . . adversity exists when the applicant’s
interests would not promote and protect the proposed ward’s wellbeing.135
Thetford’s insistence that she did not need a guardian was insufficient
128. Id. at 376 (citing Nat’l Med. Enters., Inc. v. Godbey, 924 S.W.2d 123, 132 (Tex.
1996)).
129. Id. (citing TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.06 cmt. 6, reprinted in
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, § 9)).
130. Id. at 376 (citing TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.06 cmt. 2).
131. Id. (internal citations omitted).
132. Id. at 377.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 378–79.
135. Id. at 379.
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to demonstrate adversity.136 The evidence showed that, before her dementia worsened, Thetford had wanted Rogers to serve as her guardian
and that Rogers was not indebted to, or otherwise unaligned with, Thetford’s interests.137
The supreme court concluded its analysis by acknowledging that the
“heavy responsibility for determining the best resolution of fundamental
and emotional issues lies necessarily within the trial court’s sound discretion” and “[t]he stakes are high.”138 Nevertheless, the supreme court
found that the present record reflected the trial court’s awareness and
thoughtful consideration of the issues.139 And, even if the trial court’s
ruling was improper, it was “not final” and could be “revisit[ed] . . . at a
later stage if other information [came] to light.”140 The supreme court
denied Thetford’s petition for mandamus.
B. TEXAS JUDGES ARE PERMITTED TO TESTIFY
DISCIPLINARY CASES

IN

ATTORNEY

In October 2019, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that not only was it
appropriate for a federal bankruptcy judge to testify in an attorney disciplinary case, but that it may have been required.141 The supreme court,
opining per curiam, arrived at their decision by distinguishing close-toanalogous case law, interpreting the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, and
mixing in a healthy dose of practical procedural considerations.
The appeal arose from the trial court’s decision to disbar attorney
Mark Cantu for his violations of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct in connection with his representation of the debtor in a
bankruptcy proceeding.142 At trial, a jury found Cantu had violated multiple Disciplinary Rules including
Rule 3.02 (prohibiting lawyer from “taking a position that unreasonably increases the costs or other burdens of the case or that unreasonably delays resolution of the matter”), Rule 3.03(a)(1)
(prohibiting lawyers from “knowingly making false statements of
material fact or law to a tribunal”), Rule 3.03(a)(5) (prohibiting lawyers from knowingly offering false evidence), and Rule 8.04(a)(3)
(prohibiting lawyers from “engaging in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation”).143
Plaintiffs, the Commission for Lawyer Discipline, relied heavily on testimony from their expert witness, Judge Marvin Isgur.144 Judge Isgur had
136. Id.
137. Id. at 379–80.
138. Id. at 380.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline v. Cantu, 587 S.W.3d 779, 780 (Tex. 2019) (per
curiam).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 781.
144. Id.
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presided over the action in which Cantu demonstrated questionable behavior.145 Judge Isgur testified, among other things, that Cantu had “displayed a pattern of omission, obfuscation and noncompliance,” had
“given false oaths in the bankruptcy court,” and had “refused to comply
with lawful Court orders.”146
The court of appeals reversed and remanded on appeal, holding that
the admission of Judge Isgur’s testimony was improper.147 The appellate
court based its opinion on a critical analysis of the supreme court’s decision in Joachim v. Chambers.148 In front of the supreme court, Cantu
argued that the logic from Joachim should control—that the judge is not
supposed to tell the jury how to vote.149 The supreme court interpreted
Joachim differently. It reasoned that the holding in Joachim was limited
to the case specific facts.150 According to the supreme court, Joachim did
not announce a general rule against judicial testimony and actually acknowledged that judges are generally competent to testify.151
The supreme court went on to reason that disallowing judges to testify
in lawyer disciplinary cases “would place judge-initiated grievances at an
artificial disadvantage relative to other grievances in which the complainant may freely testify.”152 Therefore, “whereas Joachim sought to protect
the integrity of the judiciary by limiting judicial expert testimony, in
Cantu’s case, excluding judicial testimony could have had the opposite
effect by suggesting to the jury, at Cantu’s urging, that judges do not
stand behind their accusations.”153 Still, Joachim was found to be fundamentally different because, unlike the present case, the judge in Joachim
had not participated in the prior proceedings, let alone conducted the
prior proceedings.154 Judge Isgur was a fact witness with expert knowledge of standard conduct.155 The judge in Joachim was a hired expert
whose role was to impress the judicial seal of approval on the plaintiff’s
case.
But beyond distinguishing Joachim, the supreme court supported its
opinion by citing to the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, specifically Canon 3(B)(6) and the corresponding commentary, which reads:
“A judge should take appropriate action upon receipt of reliable information . . . that a lawyer violated applicable rules of professional conduct . . .
reporting the conduct to the appropriate authorities . . . or otherwise cooperating with or participating in judicial or lawyer disciplinary proceed145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(citing Joachim v. Chambers, 815 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. 1991)).
at 782.
at 783.

at 784.
at 785.
at 785–86.
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ings.”156 The supreme court found the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct
Canon 3(D)(2) and the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct
8.03(a) both comparable and supportive, considering the language of the
Texas Code closely mirroring the federal code, and Judge Isgur’s obligation as a lawyer to “inform the appropriate disciplinary authority” if he
became aware of any “professional conduct that raises a substantial question as to [a] lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer.”157
The Texas Code of Judicial Conduct comports: “A judge who receive[d]
information clearly establishing that a lawyer has committed a violation
of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct should take appropriate action.”158
Note however, while the supreme court found it proper, and perhaps
necessary, for Judge Isgur’s testimony to be admitted, it also determined
that any testimony about Cantu’s character would be improper.159 Judge
Isgur has not testified as to Cantu’s character when he “confirmed that he
based his decisions as a judge in part on the credibility of witnesses” nor
when he testified that he found certain of Cantu’s actions “frivolous
things.”160
III. HEALTHCARE LIABILITY
A. INTRODUCTION
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court delivered law-clarifying and law-changing decisions relating to healthcare liability. A common theme found throughout the court’s decisions was that the court
considered cases that turned on an issue of statutory interpretation. One
such case even triggered the Texas legislature to amend statutory language after the supreme court interpreted the statutory text.
B. TEXAS SUPREME COURT CONCLUDES FALSIFYING MEDICAL
RECORDS IS A HEALTHCARE LIABILITY CLAIM, RESOLVING
COURTS OF APPEALS’ SPLIT
Those familiar with the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA) probably
know that the TMLA places additional hurdles in front of claimants who
want to bring a healthcare liability claim against a physician or healthcare
provider. The TMLA, codified at Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code
Chapter 74, requires a claimant to provide an expert report within 120
days after the defendant files its original answer.161 The purpose of the
expert-report provision is to “ensure frivolous claims are eliminated
156. Id. at 784.
157. Id.
158. Id. (citing TEX. CODE JUD. COND. CANON 3(D)(2), reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE
ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. B).
159. Id. at 786.
160. Id.
161. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(a).
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quickly.”162 The expert-report requirement serves to dissuade claimants
who bring frivolous claims for the purpose of extorting an undeserved
settlement from the defendant that wants to avoid the very costly discovery process.
The events that gave rise to Baylor Scott & White, Hillcrest Medical
Center v. Weems began with a plaintiff, Ruthen Weems (Plaintiff), who
had previously been indicted on criminal charges of aggravated assault
with a firearm.163 Plaintiff then brought this action against Baylor, Scott
& White, Hillcrest Medical Center (Baylor/Defendant) for intentional infliction of emotional distress, asserting that the only evidence leading to
his indictment in his criminal case was a fraudulent medical report that a
Baylor nurse prepared.164 The issue the Texas Supreme Court addressed
was whether a falsified-medical-records claim is a healthcare liability
claim, and therefore subject to the TMLA’s expert-report
requirements.165
The nurse’s medical report pertained to the victim of the aggravated
assault and described the victim’s injuries as a point-blank gunshot
wound to the head.166 In his pleadings, Plaintiff alleged that the nurse
fabricated the report as a result of police coercion to cover up an unlawful entry into Plaintiff’s motel room and an illegal search.167 To support
his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim that the nurse knowingly, intentionally, and willingly falsified the report, Plaintiff further asserted that a forensics expert in his criminal case later contradicted the
report and determined it was not possible the victim was shot.168 Baylor
invoked the TMLA’s civil-liability limitations as a defense in its answer
and prematurely filed a TMLA dismissal motion, which effectively put
Plaintiff on notice that his claims may be subject to the TMLA’s expertreport requirements.169 While Plaintiff’s claims largely hinged on the
truthfulness of his allegations that the forensic expert contradicted the
nurse’s medical report, Plaintiff did not serve a report from that forensic
expert, or any expert report, on the defendant as the TMLA requires.170
Instead, Plaintiff asserted his intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims were not medical malpractice claims subject to the TMLA’s additional expert-report requirements.171
This case highlighted the court of appeals’ split by way of its procedural
posture. The case arose in the Tenth Waco Court of Appeals, but the
Waco court transferred the appeal to the Sixth Texarkana Court of Ap162.
2019).
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Baylor Scott & White, Hillcrest Med. Ctr. v. Weems, 575 S.W.3d 357, 363 (Tex.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 361.
at 360–61.
at 361.
at 362.
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peals due to a docket-equalization order.172 In its curt two-paragraph
opinion, the Texarkana court restated its previously-established disagreement with the Waco court on this issue.173 The Texarkana court had to
apply Waco precedent pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure
41.3, however, because it had received the case pursuant to the docketequalization order.174 The supreme court acknowledged the split and
took the opportunity to resolve the divide.175
As noted by the supreme court, the TMLA defines a healthcare liability claim as:
a cause of action against a health care provider or physician for treatment, lack of treatment, or other claimed departure from accepted
standards of medical care, or health care, or safety or professional or
administrative services directly related to health care, which proximately results in injury to or death of a claimant, whether the claimant’s claim or cause of action sounds in tort or contract.176
The supreme court had to determine whether Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim based on falsified medical records fell
within this statutory definition as a matter of law.177 A rebuttable presumption arises that a claim is a healthcare liability claim under the
TMLA when the claim is “based on facts implicating the defendant’s conduct during the course of a patient’s care, treatment, or confinement.”178
It may not be immediately obvious that an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim179 such as this one—where the claimant has no relation to the patient who was the subject of the medical care—is properly
characterized as a healthcare liability claim. The court noted, however,
that how plaintiffs title their claims is not dispositive of whether the
TMLA applies.180 Because the facts Plaintiff alleged in his pleadings implicated Defendant’s conduct during the course of a patient’s care, treatment, or confinement, Plaintiff had the burden to first rebut the
presumption the TMLA applied.181 What is notable is that while the defendant must be a healthcare provider or physician for the claim to be
subject to the TMLA, there are no similar restrictions on the claimant’s
172. Id.
173. Weems v. Baylor, Scott & White, Hillcrest Med. Ctr., 566 S.W.3d 293, 294 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2017), rev’d, 575 S.W.3d 357 (Tex. 2019) (citing Benson v. Vernon, 303
S.W.3d 755, 759 (Tex. App.—Waco 2009, no pet.)); see TTHR, L.P. v. Coffman, 338 S.W.3d
103, 111 n.2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, no pet.) (“The [Waco] court offered no analysis
to support its distinction of [the falsifying-medical-records] claim from the other [healthcare liability] allegations made . . . . We therefore do not find Benson persuasive on this
issue.”).
174. Weems, 575 S.W.3d at 362 n.6.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 363 (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001(a)(13)).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Plaintiff also pled fraud in his appellate brief, which the court included in its analysis. Id.
180. Id. (“As our precedent makes clear, a party cannot avoid Chapter 74’s requirements and limitations through artful pleading.”).
181. Id.
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characterization; the claimant does not need to be the patient, the patient’s guardian, or a “friend of the patient” to bring a claim on behalf of
the patient.182
Once the court determined Plaintiff did not overcome the rebuttable
presumption that the TMLA applied, it made quick work in determining
Plaintiff’s claim fell well within the TMLA’s definition of a healthcare
liability claim because the claim (1) “alleged [a] departure from accepted
standards of ‘professional or administrative services directly related to
health care’”; and (2) caused plaintiff’s injuries.183 With respect to causation, the supreme court noted the TMLA is not limited to bodily injury as
the statutory definition contemplates causes of action that sound in tort
or contract.184 The supreme court then looked to the statutory definitions
in the Texas Administrative Code to conclude that accurately recording
diagnoses in a medical record is a professional or administrative service
the Department of State Health Service and the Texas Medical Board
require.185
The final step in deconstructing the statutory definition of what is considered a healthcare liability claim in this case was whether falsifying
medical records “directly related” to healthcare.186 This inquiry was a
somewhat closer call for the supreme court—and was where the Texarkana and Waco courts of appeals disagreed—yet the supreme court had
little difficulty in determining that falsifying medical records is directly
related to heath care.187 After reciting the definitions of “[d]irectly related”188 and “[h]ealth care,”189 and reciting the statutory requirements
requiring accuracy and accessibility of medical records,190 the supreme
court agreed with the Texarkana court of appeals when it concluded that
creating and maintaining accurate medical records is a professional or administrative service directly related to healthcare.191 The reasoning the
supreme court offered in making this determination was that physicians
base their treatment on previous or current diagnoses and therefore accurate medical records are imperative to keep physicians properly informed.192 However, the supreme court did not overturn the previous
conflicting Waco court of appeals decision in its entirety on this issue. The
court in Benson did not elaborate on the circumstances surrounding the
falsified medical records in that case or whether the physician fabricated
182. See id. at 363–64, 364 n.19.
183. Id. at 364.
184. Id. at 364 n.22 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001(a)(13)).
185. Id. at 364–65 (first citing 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 133.121(1), (1)(B), 133.41(j)(1),
(j)(4); then citing 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 160.20(5), 165.1(a), (a)(1)(B), (a)(10)).
186. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.153; Weems, 575 S.W.3d at 365.
187. See Weems, 575 S.W.3d at 365.
188. Id. (citing CHRISTUS Health Gulf Coast v. Carswell, 505 S.W.3d 528, 536 (Tex.
2016)).
189. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001(a)(10)).
190. Id. (citing 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 165.1(a), a(2), (a)(10)).
191. Id. (citing TTHR, L.P. v. Coffman, 338 S.W.3d 103, 109 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2011, no pet.)).
192. See id.
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medical records in their entirety.193 To the extent a falsified medical record has no nexus to a patient’s care—or possibly in situations where it is
uncertain whether any patient or any care ever even existed, e.g., cases of
fraud—the supreme court did not reach the issue.194 This open question
leads one to make a reasonable inference that completely manufactured
records may not fall under the TMLA.195 For now, however, falsifiedmedical-records claims do fall under the TMLA under ordinary
circumstances.
C. “IN A” COMMA, THE SUPREME COURT PROMPTS THE
LEGISLATURE TO CHANGE THE LAW ON EMERGENCY CARE
In late 2018, the Texas Supreme Court delivered an opinion radical
enough to spur the Texas legislature to quickly amend the TMLA section
that the supreme court interpreted. This section is one of several that
relate to the negligence standard a claimant must show to hold a physician liable for deviating from the ordinary standard of care when the physician provides emergency medical services. The supreme court’s opinion
demonstrates the importance of punctuation in statutory construction
and provides a reminder to the legislature it will not soon forget.
The facts of this case are fairly straightforward: a mother checked into
the obstetrical unit of Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital of Denton the
night before giving birth and the decision was made to induce labor the
following day at thirty-nine weeks.196 Complications arose during delivery that resulted in permanent nerve damage to the baby’s shoulder.197
Notably, the complications (the emergency) arose during the ordinary
course of labor and delivery.198 The parents sued the hospital, the delivering doctor, and his practice group, claiming the doctor’s and attending
nurse’s negligence caused their child’s injuries.199 The only issue on this
interlocutory appeal was the doctor’s claim that Section 74.153 of the
TMLA prevented the family from recovering based on only ordinary negligence and instead required the parents to show the doctor acted with
willful and wanton negligence.200 The dispute was that the doctor argued
the willful and wanton negligence standard applied at all times in the hospital’s obstetrical unit while the family argued it applied only immediately
after the patient had been examined in the hospital’s emergency department.201 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the doctor
193. See Benson v. Vernon, 303 S.W.3d 755, 759–60 (Tex. App.—Waco 2009, no pet.);
id. at 767 (Gray, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
194. See Weems, 575 S.W.3d at 366 n.39.
195. See id.
196. Tex. Health Presbyterian Hosp. of Denton v. D.A., 569 S.W.3d 126, 128 (Tex.
2018).
197. Id.
198. See id.
199. Id. at 128–29.
200. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.153; Tex. Health Presbyterian Hosp.
of Denton, 569 S.W.3d at 129.
201. Tex. Health Presbyterian Hosp. of Denton, 569 S.W.3d at 129–30.
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on this issue, but the Second Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded after it first found the statute’s language ambiguous.202 By accepting the doctor’s petition for review, the supreme court halted a line of
precedent that had started to stem from the court of appeals’ opinion.203
Although the supreme court ultimately disagreed with the court of appeals’ opinion, the court of appeals’ analysis is instructional to understand
the legislature’s intent when it enacted the TMLA’s provisions relating to
the negligence standard applicable when providing emergency medical
care.
A facial reading of Section 74.153 shows that the statute provides a
semi-safe harbor for physicians providing medical care under emergency
situations where the physician may be “operating blind” without the benefit of knowing the patient’s medical history.204 Under Section 74.153, a
claimant must show the physician deviated from accepted medical standards by willful and wanton negligence when the physician is providing
emergency medical care rather than mere ordinary negligence, which is
applicable in the TMLA’s non-emergency care provisions.205 The relevant language of Section 74.153 as the statute existed when the supreme
court issued its opinion in this case stated that to impose liability, a plaintiff must show willful and wanton negligence when the physician or
healthcare provider performs emergency medical care: “in a hospital
emergency department or obstetrical unit or in a surgical suite immediately following the evaluation or treatment of a patient in a hospital
emergency department.”206 The court of appeals considered why Section
74.153 provides the heightened standard and semi-safe harbor by first applying the “Related Statutes” canon.207 The court of appeals viewed Section 74.153’s immediately preceding and succeeding sections, which also
relate to providing emergency care services, as instructional to determine
what level of negligence the legislature intended when it enacted Section
74.153.208 The court explained:
These four statutes, read together, signal a concern that in circumstances when emergency medical care must occur in the dark—when
medical care providers or first responders perform blindfolded as to
202. D.A. v. Tex. Health Presbyterian Hosp. of Denton, 514 S.W.3d 431, 432 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2017), rev’d, 569 S.W.3d 126 (Tex. 2018).
203. Tex. Health Presbyterian Hosp. of Denton, 569 S.W.3d at 129–30; see, e.g., Glenn v.
Leal, 546 S.W.3d 807 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018), review granted, judgm’t rev’d,
596 S.W.3d 769 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam).
204. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.153; see also D.A., 514 S.W.3d at
442.
205. Compare TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.151 (willful and wanton negligence is the applicable standard to situations providing emergency medical care), with TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.101 (ordinary negligence standard is the applicable
standard when providing medical care to a patient with informed consent and a knowledge
of the patient’s medical history).
206. Tex. Health Presbyterian Hosp. of Denton, 569 S.W.3d at 129.
207. D.A., 514 S.W.3d at 440–42.
208. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 74.151, 74.152, 74.154; D.A., 514
S.W.3d at 440–41.
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the recipient’s relevant past and current medical conditions—those
medical care providers should not be held to a standard of ordinary
negligence. Instead, before the beneficiary of emergency medical
care administered under such inauspicious circumstances may seek
damages for negligent care received, he or she must prove that the
medical care provider deviated from the standard of care by a willful
and wanton degree.209
According to the court of appeals, the “Related Statutes” canon suggested the purpose of the heightened negligence standard that applies in
the emergency care situation is to protect those who must provide emergency medical care without first having the opportunity to review the patient’s medical history.210
The court of appeals next looked to the statute’s legislative history and
concluded that the legislature contemplated almost this exact scenario
when enacting this provision.211 A discussion between Senators Ratliff
and Hinojosa explained that the heightened negligence standard of Section 74.153 applies only when the patient goes immediately to an obstetrical unit from the emergency room but not during emergencies that arise
during the normal course of labor and delivery or that arise after the
patient has been stabilized.212 A similar conversation in the Texas House
of Representatives between Representatives Eiland and Nixon confirms
what the court suggested when applying the “Related Statutes” canon—
the purpose behind the heightened negligence standard is to protect only
those providing emergency care without the benefit of the patient’s medical history.213
The supreme court disagreed and concluded Section 74.153’s language
is unambiguous.214 When statutory language is unambiguous, courts are
prohibited from considering extrinsic aids such as legislative intent.215 As
the supreme court explained, an unambiguous statute’s plain language is
the best evidence of the legislature’s intent because it is the final votedupon version of the law; not even the statements of the bill’s author or
sponsor can provide insight into the “understandings, intentions, or motives of the many other legislators who vote in favor of a bill.”216 The
court’s “responsibility is to construe the language the legislature enacted,
not to determine what the legislature or any individual legislators may
have meant to enact.”217
The supreme court homed in on two key parts of the statute’s text. The
first was the phrase “in a” that preceded “hospital emergency depart209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
2018).
215.
216.
217.

D.A., 514 S.W.3d at 442.
See id.
Id. at 442–43.
Id. at 443 (citing S.J. of Tex., 78th Leg., R.S. 5003, 5004 (2003)).
See id. (citing H.J. of Tex., 78th Leg., R.S. 6040 (2003)).
Tex. Health Presbyterian Hosp. of Denton v. D.A., 569 S.W.3d 126, 135 (Tex.
See id. at 135 (citing Sullivan v. Abraham, 488 S.W.3d 294, 299 (Tex. 2016)).
Id. at 136–37.
Id. at 137.
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ment” and “surgical suite” but not “obstetrical unit.”218 The second textual piece the supreme court focused on was the notable omission of a
comma following either “obstetrical unit” or “surgical suite.”219 The
omitted commas informed the supreme court as to when Section 74.153’s
heightened standard applies.220 Had a comma followed “surgical suite,”
the supreme court explained, the phrase beginning “immediately following” would modify all three locations in the series: hospital emergency
department, obstetrical unit, and surgical suite.221 But if a comma instead
appeared after “obstetrical unit,” the phrase “immediately following”
would have only modified the surgical suite location.222 An absence of
both commas, as was the case in this version of the statute, however, rendered the language ambiguous.223
The supreme court dissected Section 74.153 and explained the physician’s interpretation would imply the legislature intended the statute be
read such that the wanton and willful negligence standard applies when
physicians provide emergency medical care:
[1] in a hospital
[a] emergency department or
[b] obstetrical unit or
[2] in a surgical suite immediately following the evaluation or treatment of a patient in a hospital emergency department.224
Reading the statute this way means that the phrase “immediately following” only modifies “surgical suite” and not “obstetrical unit.” Therefore,
under this interpretation the willful and wanton standard applies at all
times in an obstetrical unit, but in a surgical suite only when the patient
just left the emergency room.
On the other hand, the family’s interpretation requires reading the statute such that the willful and wanton negligence standard applies when a
physician provides emergency medical care:
[1] in a
[a] hospital emergency department or
[b] obstetrical unit or
[c] in a surgical suite
[2] immediately following the evaluation or treatment of a patient
in a hospital emergency department.225
Applying this interpretation, because the statute makes no distinction between the three hospital areas, the willful and wanton negligence standard applies in equal force to all three locations but only right after the
patient was evaluated in the emergency room. Looking at the statute’s
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id. at 133.
Id. at 131.
See id.
Id. at 132.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 130.
Id.
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language as the supreme court dissected it, one notices a glaring inconsistency in the family’s interpretation—“in a” appears in [1] and [c], but not
in [a] or [b].226 By deleting the second “in a,” according to the family’s
interpretation, the statute’s meaning would not change, but would actually become more clear.227 Therefore, the supreme court could not ignore
the second “in a” and concluded the “surgical suite” phrase must be considered as a phrase distinct from the two preceding phrases in the series.228 According to the supreme court, the physician’s interpretation of
the statute was the only reasonable interpretation in light of the fact that
“in a” preceded only “hospital emergency department” and “surgical
suite” but not “obstetrical unit” as far as where in the hospital the heightened negligence standard applies.229
While the absence of any commas made the statute ambiguous, the
omission of “in an” before “obstetrical unit” was ultimately determinative for the supreme court. This meant the only reasonable interpretation
was the physician’s interpretation that the willful and wanton standard
applied in obstetrical units at all times, regardless of whether the patient
was evaluated in the emergency room immediately beforehand.230 Therefore, the supreme court reversed the court of appeals’ holding and reinstated the trial court’s decision which granted summary judgment to the
physician.231
After the supreme court’s interpretation of the statute as written, the
legislature quickly responded to amend the statute. The legislature passed
House Bill 2362 by a vote of 107–36 in the House and 28–3 in the Senate.232 The bill’s author described the intent behind amending the statute
by stating: “The law relating to the standard of proof for medical malpractice cases is overbroad and has led to unnecessary lawsuits. H.B. 2362
attempts to address this issue by specifying certain situations where the
standard of proof does not apply.”233 The statute’s amended text, which
went into effect September 1, 2019, reads:
[(a) Except as provided by Subsection (b), in] In a suit involving a
health care liability claim against a physician or health care provider
for injury to or death of a patient arising out of the provision of
emergency medical care in a hospital emergency department or [, in
an] obstetrical unit[,] or in a surgical suite immediately following the
226. See id. at 133.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 132–133 (citing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:
THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 141 (2012)). The supreme court seemed unconcerned that this interpretation also seems to illogically suggest that the willful and wanton
negligence standard would apply in a hospital emergency department only after the patient
had just been seen in a hospital emergency department.
229. Id. at 131, 133–35.
230. Id. at 135, 137.
231. Id. at 137.
232. See H.J. of Tex., 86th Leg., R.S. 3170 (2019); S.J. of Tex., 86th Leg., R.S. 2613
(2019).
233. See House Comm. on Judiciary & Civil Jurisprudence, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B.
2362, 86th Leg., R.S. (2019).
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evaluation or treatment of a patient in a hospital emergency department, the claimant bringing the suit may prove that . . . the physician
or health care provider departed from accepted standards of medical
care or health care only if the claimant shows . . . that the physician
or health care provider, with willful and wanton negligence, deviated
from the degree of care and skill that is reasonably expected of an
ordinarily prudent physician or health care provider . . . .234
The amended language appears to successfully reflect the legislature’s intent that the heightened negligence standard applies only when a physician is effectively “operating blind” without the benefit of the patient’s
medical history. The legislature further narrowed the safe-harbor provision by adding subsection (b), which reduced the standard to ordinary
negligence once the patient was stabilized and had been receiving nonemergency medical treatment.235 Whether the amendment will have the
desired effect still remains to be seen.236
While the physician and practice group in this case were exonerated,
the win for the amici curiae who briefed the issues in support of the physician was short-lived. The amici brief argued (1) the court of appeals’
textual reading of the statute was incorrect; and (2) that reading was inconsistent with the realities of childbirth.237 The amici consisted of the
Texas Alliance for Patient Access, the Texas Medical Association, the
Texas Osteopathic Medical Association, the Texas Hospital Association,
the Texas Association of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,238 all of which understandably had a strong interest in the supreme court interpreting the
statute to apply the heightened negligence standard at all times in the
obstetrical unit. Because the supreme court agreed with the amici’s textual interpretation, it did not need to reach the merits of the realities the
amici presented that occurred in delivery rooms.
Regardless of how biased they may be, the amici present a compelling
argument concerning the reality of the situations that obstetrical units
regularly face—an argument that highlights scenarios that cut against
234. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.153. Brackets and strikethroughs included to assist in comparing the relevant amended text.
235. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.153(b).
236. In its opinion delivered on February 21, 2020—after the Survey period—the supreme court reversed and remanded Glenn without entertaining oral arguments in light of
its decision in this case, which had already abrogated Tex. Health. See Glenn v. Leal, 596
S.W.3d 769 (Tex. 2020); see also Tex. Health Presbyterian Hosp. of Denton, 569 S.W.3d at
130 n.4. Without expressly referencing the legislature’s 2019 amendment, the court may
have considered the legislature’s response to its opinion in this case because the court
reversed and remanded Glenn, rather than reversed and rendered, concluding the trial
court committed reversible error by giving an erroneous jury charge. Glenn, 596 S.W.3d at
772.
237. See Brief for Texas Alliance for Patient Access et al. as Amici Curiae supporting
Petitioners at 10–11, 13, Tex. Health Presbyterian Hosp. of Denton v. D.A., 569 S.W.3d 126
(Tex. 2018) (No. 17-0256).
238. Id. at 4.
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what the legislature may have thought they enacted.239 In their second
issue, the amici argued that obstetrical units regularly receive patients to
whom they provide emergency care regardless of whether the patient was
first admitted to the emergency room.240 The amici noted that to apply
the heightened negligence standard only after the patient has been seen
in the emergency room will incentivize hospitals to reroute patients first
through the emergency room before reaching the obstetrical unit where
the patient would presumably receive more appropriate care.241 Moreover, some hospitals have policies in place that require “patients past a
certain point in their pregnancy to be seen in the obstetrical unit instead
of the emergency department except in cases of trauma,” such as a car
wreck.242
The consequence of the statute’s amended language, if one gives
credence to the amici’s assertions, is that hospitals may need to either (1)
amend their policies to permit late-term pregnancy patients to be admitted to the emergency room, which could have obvious unintended negative consequences if such a policy causes a delay in, or effectively
prohibits, transferring the emergency patient to an obstetrical unit that is
better equipped to handle labor and delivery; or (2) enhance their emergency room facilities and physicians to rival better-equipped obstetrical
units. Either solution is arguably inefficient and unnecessary given the
availability and expertise of obstetrical units. A simple solution would
have been to remove the “immediately following” qualifier and instead
have amended the statute to state exactly what the legislature appears to
have intended, at least with respect to obstetrical units: the willful and
wanton negligence standard applies when the patient arrives at the obstetrical unit only under emergency circumstances and while those circumstances persist, and when the attending physician must provide
emergency medical care without the ability to evaluate the patient’s medical history.243
Nevertheless, it is encouraging to see the legislature take action to correct a misunderstanding when it believes the law has been interpreted in
a way that it did not intend.

239. See House Comm. on Judiciary & Civil Jurisprudence, Bill analysis, Tex. H.B.
2362, 86th Leg., R.S. (2019).
240. Brief for Texas Alliance for Patient Access et al. as Amici Curiae supporting Petitioners, supra note 237, at 13.
241. Id. at 14.
242. Id. at 13–14.
243. See, e.g., S.J. of Tex., 78th Leg., R.S. 5003–04 (2003); H.J. of Tex., 78th Leg., R.S.
6040 (2003).

288

SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY

[Vol. 6

